Retaliatory Eviction as a Defense to Unlawful Detainer--Alternative Approaches by Ellis, Raymond G.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 22 | Issue 5 Article 11
1-1971
Retaliatory Eviction as a Defense to Unlawful
Detainer--Alternative Approaches
Raymond G. Ellis
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Raymond G. Ellis, Retaliatory Eviction as a Defense to Unlawful Detainer--Alternative Approaches, 22 Hastings L.J. 1365 (1971).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol22/iss5/11
RETALIATORY EVICTION AS A DEFENSE TO
UNLAWFUL DETAINER-ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES?
John Schweiger had occupied an apartment in a 19-unit apartment
building for 4 years under an oral month-to-month tenancy.' On
June 16, 1969, he sent a letter, pursuant to California Civil Code sec-
tions 19412 and 1942,1 requesting his landlord to repair two broken
windows and a broken, unlockable back door.4  The landlord re-
sponded with a notice that, commencing August 1, the rent would be
increased from $75 to $125 per month. The broken windows were
repaired by the landlord during the month of July, but the back door
was not. On August 1, Schweiger paid only $60 rent-the former rate
of $75 less $15 estimated for repairing the back door. He later re-
paired the back door at a cost of $35.45. After serving Schweiger with
a 3-day notice demanding an additional $65 rent,5 the landlord com-
menced an unlawful detainer action in small claims court in which he
recovered judgment for possession and $29.55-$125 rent due less
$60 paid and $35.45 for repair of the back door. The superior court
affirmed after a trial de novo,0 rejecting as matter of law Schweiger's
1. In the absence of local custom on the subject, an oral hiring of real property
is presumed to be a month-to-month tenancy. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1943.
2. CAL. Cv. CODE § 1941 provides: 'The lessor of a building intended for the
occupation of human beings must, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put
it into a condition fit for such occupation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations
thereof, which render it untenantable, except such as are mentioned in section nineteen
hundred and twenty-nine."
3. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942, prior to amendment by Cal. Stat. 1970, ch. 1280,
§ 3, at 2315 provided: "If within a reasonable time after notice to the lessor, of dilapi-
dations which he ought to repair, he neglects to do so, the lessee may repair the same
himself, where the cost of such repairs dores] not require an expenditure greater than
one month's rent of the premises, and deduct the expenses of such repairs from the rent,
or the lessee may vacate the premises, in which case he shall be discharged from further
payment of rent, or performance of other conditions."
4. Similar repair and deduct remedies are found in the statutes of 5 other states.
LA. CiV. CoDE ANN. arts. 2692-94 (West 1952); MoNT. Rav. CODES ANN. § 42-201,
42-202 (1947); N.D. CEm. CODE H9 47-16-12, 47-16-13 (1960); OKLA. STAT. tit.
41, H9 31-32 (1961); S.D. ComPILED LAws ANN. § 43-32-8, 43-32-9 (1967).
5. Before commencing an unlawful detainer action after default in the payment of
rent, a landlord must give 3 days' written notice demanding its payment. CAL. CODa
CIV. PRoc. § 1161.
6. Trial de novo and an automatic stay pending appeal are required whenever
a small claims court hears an unlawful detainer proceeding. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
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defense of retaliatory eviction. Nevertheless, the court certified the
case to the court of appeal to determine the following question of law:
[M]ay a tenant defend an unlawful detainer action on the ground
that his landlord increased the rents and commenced the eviction
action in retaliation against him because he made a demand for re-
pairs pursuant to Civil Code sections 1941 and 1942?
7
The court of appeal refused to transfer the case. Schweiger then
sought a writ of mandate from the California Supreme Court to compel
the superior court to hear his defense of retaliatory eviction. Held, per
Justice Mosk, writ should issue. Sound statutory construction requires
reconciling the repair and deduct statute with the unlawful detainer stat-
ute by recognizing a defense in unlawful detainer actions when the land-
lord's motive is retaliation for the exercise of statutory rights. "Adoption
of the alternative course would suggest a devious legislative intent to ren-
der [the repair and deduct section] ineffective. .. .
The issue,' as seen by the California Supreme Court, was one of
statutory construction requiring the resolution of two apparently con-
flicting code sections. Code of Civil Procedure section 1161 implies
that a landlord has unrestricted power to raise the rent and evict default-
ing tenants;"° Civil Code section 1942, however, permits the tenant to
repair dilapidations and deduct the cost from his rent. In resolving this
conflict, the court relied principally upon the District of Columbia case
of Edwards v. Habib."
In Edwards an unlawful detainer action was prompted by the ten-
ant's complaints to housing officials about sanitation and housing code
violations. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
§ 117j. The former procedure in which a stay was discretionary was held to violate
due process. Mendoza v. Small Claims Court, 49 Cal. 2d 668, 321 P.2d 9 (1958).
7. Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 511, 476 P.2d 97, 99, 90
Cal. Rptr. 729, 731 (1970).
8. Id. at 513, 476 P.2d at 100, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
9. An amicus curiae brief urged a consideration of the broader issues of the doc-
trine of implied warranty of habitability and the contract theory of leases. Brief for
Western Center on Law and Poverty, Los Angeles, California as Amicus Curiae. The
petitioner, however, did not feel that this was an appropriate case for the resolution of
those issues. Letter from Legal Aid Society of Alameda County to California Su-
preme Court Justices, July 27, 1970.
10. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1161 provides, in part: "A tenant of real property,
for a term less than life . . . is guilty of unlawful detainer:
2. When he continues in possession. . . without the permission of his land-
lord. . . after default in the payment of rent, pursuant to the lease or agreement under
which the property is held, and three days' notice, in writing, requiring its payment,
stating the amount which is due, or possession of the property, shall have been served
upon him ....
11. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
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cussed the constitutional issues'2 but based its decision upon statutory
construction and public policy. In reconciling the unlimited power of
landlords to evict with the housing and sanitation codes, the court held
the eviction statutes inapplicable where the eviction is sought in retalia-
tion for reporting housing code violations.1 3  The factual situation of
Edwards differed from that of Schweiger in two respects. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court recognized the distinction between reporting code
violations and exercising a statutory right; it felt, however, that since
the remedies in Civil Code section 1942 depend exclusively on self-
help, the reasons for not frustrating the purpose of the statute are even
more compelling. A second distinction, which was not discussed, con-
cerns the ostensible grounds for commencing the unlawful detainer ac-
tion. In Edwards the basis was failure to quit the premises after no-
tice; in the present case, the basis was failure to pay the increased rent.
It is clear, however, that this difference does not require a contrary re-
sult; if such a distinction were held to be material, the Edwards holding
could be evaded simply by doubling or tripling the rent as an inter-
mediate step in the procedure for evicting tenants who exercise their
rights. 4
In allowing the defense of retaliatory eviction, the court indicated
that it was following equitable principles which are applicable when
a forfeiture is sought in an action for unlawful detainer. Generally,
California courts have not permitted counterclaims, 5 cross-complaints' 6
or affirmative defenses' 7 in an unlawful detainer action for the reason
that this would frustrate the summary nature of the remedy. An ex-
ception to the general rule excluding affirmative defenses has been rec-
ognized when the defense is based upon equitable grounds which
would negate the facts upon which the right to terminate the tenancy
depends.' 8 In Abstract Investment Co. v. Hutchinson,'9 upon which
the court relies, a tenant in an unlawful detainer action was held to have
12. The constitutional argument proceeded on first amendment grounds not ap-
plicable here.
13. 397 F.2d at 702.
14. The 1970 Legislature also recognized this evil: CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942.5
prohibits evictions, decreases in services and rent raises in retaliation for the exercise
of statutory rights or for reporting code violations.
15. Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 146 P. 423 (1915).
16. Id.
17. Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, 4 Cal. App. 3d 716, 721, 84 Cal. Rptr. 756, 760
(1970); Smith v. Whyers, 64 Cal. App. 193, 221 P. 387 (1923). But see Portnoy v.
Hill, 57 Misc. 2d 1097, 294 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Binghamton City Ct. 1968) (N.Y. Real
Property Actions & Proceedings Law § 743 allows any legal or equitable defense or
counterclaim).
18. See cases collected in Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, 4 Cal. App. 3d 716, 722-23,
84 Cal. Rptr. 756, 760-61 (1970).
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the right to produce evidence that he was being evicted solely because
of his race, a ground which would bar the court from ordering his evic-
tion because such state action would be violative of equal protection.
The court in Abstract, quoting from an earlier decision, stated that:
[A]lthough the [unlawful detainer] remedy provided by law is
summary in principle and process, nevertheless the very nature of
the action, involving as it does, a forfeiture, appeals to the equity
side of the court, and in turn requires a "full examination of all of
the equities involved to the end that exact justice be done."
20
Also persuasive to the California Supreme Court were two cases
forbidding the termination of employment contracts at will where the
employers' reasons for dismissal were against public policy. In Glenn
v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn21 the employees were discharged be-
cause they had applied for union membership. The court held that
the power of the employer to terminate employment contracts at will
was limited by the right of employees to organize. Similarly, in Peter-
mann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters-2 an employee was
discharged for refusing to perjure himself before a state assembly com-
mittee. In allowing the employee to recover damages, the court held
that the policy against perjury limited the right of an employer to dis-
charge an employee for refusal to commit that crime. From these
cases the Schweiger court concluded that "one may not exercise normally
unrestricted power if his reasons for its exercise contravene public pol-
icy."
23
In addition to the preceding cases, the court found support in re-
cent legislation 24 and legal commentary on the subject of retaliatory
eviction. It took special note of the tentative draft of the Model Resi-
dential Landlord-Tenant Code which absolutely prohibits both rent in-
creases and evictions within 6 months after the tenant has complained
in good faith of code violations or requested repairs, unless the land-
lord can establish one of several lawful reasons.23 It is curious that
the majority looked to the Model Code and the statutes of other juris-
dictions for support of its recognition of retaliatory rent raise and evic-
tion and relegated to a footnote a discussion of Civil Code section
20. Id. at 249, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 314, quoting Knight v. Black, 19 Cal. App. 518,
525-26, 126 P. 512, 515 (1912).
21. 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961).
22. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
23. Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 516, 476 P.2d 97, 102, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 729, 734 (1970).
24. Five states in addition to California now recognize the defense of retaliatory
eviction by statute. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-540a (Supp. 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1966); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 239 § 2A (Supp. 1970);
N.J. STATS. ANN. § 2A:170-92.1 (Supp. 1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-20-10 (1970).
25. MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-407 (Ten. Draft 1969).
[Vol. 221368
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1942.5 which was added by the 1970 Legislature. This section, not
applicable to agreements entered into or renewed prior to January 1,
1971-and therefore not applicable to Schweiger-prohibits, among
other things, an eviction, rent increase or decrease in any service within
60 days after a tenant has, in good faith, given notice pursuant to sec-
tion 1942 if the landlord's dominant purpose is retaliation against the
tenant for the exercise of his rights under section 1942.0 If the land-
lord wishes to recover possession, increase the rent, or decrease any
service within the 60 day period, he must allege and prove the lawful
ground upon which he seeks to do so. This statutory defense is limited
in two important respects: it is available only once in any 12-month
period and it is available only within 60 days of the event which
prompted the retaliation.
Suppose the tenant's rent is doubled 61 days after he has given no-
tice to the landlord to repair certain dilapidations. Is he without a de-
fense to an unlawful detainer action resulting from his failure to pay the
26. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942.5 provides:
(a) If the lessor has as his dominant purpose retaliation against the lessee be-
cause of the exercise by the lessee of his rights under this chapter or because of his
complaint to an appropriate governmental agency as to tenantability of a dwelling, and if
the lessee of a dwelling is not in default as to the payment of his rent, the lessor may
not recover possession of a dwelling in any action or proceeding, cause the lessee to
quit involuntarily, increase the rent, or decrease any services, within 60 days:
(1) After the date upon which the lessee, in good faith, has given notice pur-
suant to Section 1942; or
(2) After the date upon which the lessee, in good faith, has filed a written
complaint, with an appropriate governmental agency, of which the lessor has notice, for
the purpose of obtaining correction of a condition relating to tenantability; or
(3) After the date of an inspection or issuance of a citation, resulting from a
written complaint described in paragraph (2) of which the lessor did not have notice; or
(4) After entry of judgment or the signing of an arbitration award, if any,
when in the judicial proceeding or arbitration the issue of tenantability is deter-
mined adversely to the lessor.
In each instance, the 60-day period shall run from the latest applicable date re-
ferred to in paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive.
(b) A lessee may not invoke the provisions of this section more than once in
any 12-month period.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting in any way the exer-
cise by the lessor of his rights under any lease or agreement or any law pertaining to the
hiring of property or his right to do any of the acts described in subdivision (a) for any
lawful cause. Any waiver by a lessee of his rights under this section shall be void as
contrary to public policy.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivisions (a) to (c), inclusive, a
lessor may recover possession of a dwelling and do any of the other acts described in
subdivision (a) within the period or periods prescribed therein if the notice of termina-
tion, rent increase, or other act, and any pleading or statement of issues in an arbitration,
if any, states the ground upon which the lessor, in good faith, seeks to recover possession,
increase rent, or do any of the other acts described in subdivision (a). If such state-
ment be controverted, the lessor shall establish its truth at the trial or other hearing.
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increased rent? Or suppose the tenant has used the statutory defense
and within a year a serious housing code violation becomes apparent.
Must he refrain from reporting this violation in order to remain in his
present apartment? A satisfactory resolution of these hypothetical situ-
ations can be reached only if the present case is not limited by section
1942.5. If, however, the newly created statutory defense is now the
exclusive defense to retaliatory eviction, our hypothetical tenants are not
aided by the present case even if the retaliatory motive of the landlord
is established.
The courts will soon be called upon to resolve this conflict created
by the nearly simultaneous pronouncements of the legislature and the
California Supreme Court. The judiciary will have to decide if section
1942.5 is the tenant's exclusive defense against a retaliatory eviction.
Of course, if section 1942.5 were susceptible of only one interpretation
the matter would be settled; but the silence of the statute on this issue
has produced an ambiguity, which is a condition precedent to statutory
interpretation.
2 7
It is clear from the sequence of events that section 1942.5 could
not have been intended to overrule Schweiger: although the code sec-
tion was not effective until after the date of the Schweiger decision, it
was passed before the case was decided. The real problem is whether
the legislature, acting against a background of a common law per-
mitting retaliatory evictions, intended this section to be the exclusive
defense.
In statutory interpretation, 8 the apparent purpose and intention of
the legislature are the controlling considerations. 9  Further, the entire
act must be examined in determining its purpose."0 It is clear that the
purpose of the amendment was to provide the tenant with a viable
means of securing habitable housing. Dilapidations deemed untenant-
able are enumerated in section 1941.1 to reduce the tenant's risk of
making unauthorized repairs;3 ' a 30-day period is presumed to be a
reasonable time for notice, after which the tenant may safely make
authorized repairs.32 Furthermore, any waiver of the tenant's rights
under section 1941 or 1942 is void as contrary to public policy;
33 fi-
27. Copeland v. Raub, 36 Cal. App. 2d 441, 445, 97 P.2d 859, 861 (1939).
28. At the outset it should be recognized that canons of statutory interpretation
are often merely used to rationalize a decision which has already been reached. Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HAav. L. REv. 863 (1930). Contra, Landis, A Note on
"Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REv. 886 (1930).
29. County of Alameda v. Kuchel, 32 Cal. 2d 193, 199, 195 P.2d 17, 20 (1948).
30. Mazza v. Austin, 25 Cal. App. 2d 85, 87-88, 76 P.2d 533, 535 (1938).
31. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1941.1; see Loeb, The Low-Income Tenant in California:
A Study in Frustration, 21 HAsTInls L.J. 287, 292 (1970).
32. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942(b).
33. Id. § 1942.1.
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nally, a retaliatory motive is presumed if an eviction or rent raise oc-
curs within 60 days after certain events.34
The intent of the legislature may also be discerned by its other
pronouncements on the same subject.3 5 The 1970 Legislature ex-
pressly declared its purpose with respect to housing that every Cali-
fornian be provided with a "decent home and a satisfying environ-
ment."30 It also found that housing is of "vital statewide importance to
the health, safety, morals and welfare of the residents" because, among
other reasons, "[u]nsanitary, unsafe, overcrowded, or congested dwell-
ing accommodations constitute conditions which cause an increase in,
and spread of, disease and crime. '37  The 1970 Legislature had thus
enunciated a broad policy regarding the improvement of housing condi-
tions and enacted comprehensive legislation providing the tenant with a
self-help remedy. The beneficial purposes of the statute would not be
served if the defense against retaliatory eviction is available only in the
situations specified in the code. Instead, these limitations would permit
the landlord who is motivated by retaliation to succeed in frustrating the
obvious purpose of the statute by either delaying 61 days or acting twice
within a year. 8 It is beyond question, of course, that the legislature,
in amending sections 1941 and 1942, intended to give these sections ef-
fect-a purpose which cannot be effected by limiting the defense.
Further support for the argument that the statutory defense was
intended to be supplementary can be found in the very existence of the
statute, which clearly implies that retaliatory evictions and rent raises
are unlawful. How could a retaliatory motive so inimical to public
policy as to require a presumption in favor of its victim become lawful
by the mere passage of time? The conclusion, in light of this legislative
purpose, must be that the tenant now has two defenses based on the re-
taliatory motive of his landlord: if the particular facts are within the
scope of section 1942.5 there is a presumption of retaliation; if not,
Schweiger applies, and the tenant must establish the retaliatory motive.
How will the landlord prove that his motive was not retaliatory or
that his once-retaliatory motive has been dissipated? In partial an-
swer to this problem the court quoted from Edwards:
34. Id. § 1942.5.
35. People v. Kings County Dev. Co., 48 Cal. App. 72, 79, 191 P. 1004, 1007
(1920); Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970), where the court
found that legislative policy as expressed in an urban renewal act (i.e., substandard
housing conditions existed and were detrimental to the public interest) supported the
maintenance of an unlawful detainer action to hold unlawful an eviction in retaliation
for reporting housing code violations.
36. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 37120.
37. Id. § 37121.
38. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5(c).
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If this illegal purpose is dissipated, the landlord can, in the absence
of legislation or a binding contract, evict his tenants or raise their
rents for economic or other legitimate reasons, or even for no
reason at all. The question of permissible or impermissible pur-
pose is one of fact for the court or jury. .... 39
Proof of motive is not foreign to the law,40 and a substantial wrong
should not be permitted to continue for the reason that it is difficult to
prove.41
This case represents a significant departure from the feudal char-
acteristics which have lingered so long in landlord-tenant law.42 At
last, after nearly a century the cold statutory remedies provided by
sections 1941 and 1942 have been given life;43 a tenant who exercises
these rights may now remain in possession long enough to appreciate
his repairs. However beneficial this remedy may be, it is manifestly
inadequate for major dilapidations requiring the expenditure of more
than 1 month's rent. But that is a matter for later legislation and de-
cisions. This case sets the stage for that further departure from feudal
landlord-tenant law-a recognition that the tenant's obligation to pay
rent is dependent upon the landlord's performance of his implied war-
ranty to maintain the premises in habitable condition.44
Raymond G. Ellis*
39. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
40. See, e.g., L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968)
(malpractice insurer could not cancel policy of dentist simply because insured testified in
malpractice suit against colleague insured by the same company); A.P. Green Fire Brick
Co. v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 1964) (determination of motive for dis-
missal); NLRB v. Whitin Mach. Works, 204 F.2d 883, 885 (Ist Cir. 1953) (discharge
unlawful if discrimination a substantial or motivating reason).
41. A nice distinction on the question of motive has already been made in the
District of Columbia, the jurisdiction in which Edwards was decided. In Wheeler
Terrace v. Sylvester, 2 CCH POVERTY LAW REP. 10,371 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1969), the
landlord proved that a more dominant reason than retaliation against an organizing ten-
ant was to protect himself against the tenant's plan to take over the premises by eco-
nomic pressure.
42. See Loeb, The Low-Income Tenant in California: A Study in Frustration,
21 HASTINGS L.J. 287 (1970).
43. The 1970 Legislature has also acted to improve the tenant's remedies under
these sections. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941.1 provides that a dwelling shall be deemed
untenantable if it substantially lacks, among other things, weather protection, hot and
cold running water, plumbing facilities, adequate heating, electrical lighting and prem-
ises free from vermin and garbage. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942.1 declares a waiver by
a tenant of his rights under these sections to be void as contrary to public policy.
44. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Loeb, supra note 42, at 313. But see Gibbons, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: A
Survey of Modern Problems with Reference to the Proposed Model Code, 21 HASTINGS
L.J. 369, 382-89 (1970).
* Member, Second Year Class.
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